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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"...it simply is not possible to deal adequately with data which are clearly
social psychological without getting involved with matters of power"
(Cartwright, 1959).
The present thesis proposes a model of impression formation under
asymmetrical interdependence, or power. Asymmetrical power refers to a
relationship between two individuals in which one, the powerful person, has control
over the outcomes of the other, the subordinate, but not vice versa. Because the
person in power is not primarily outcome-dependent upon the subordinate, there is
little incentive to invest the extra efTort necessary to individuate the subordinate.
Some researchers have already suggested this possibility (Beauvois & Dubois, 1988;
Leyens, 1983), which also follows from current models of impression formation to be
described later. We will thus predict that people with asymmetrical power are likely
to use category-based strategies when forming impressions of their subordinates.'
However, as Figure 1 illustrates, the effects of power are not immutable. Powerful
people can be motivated to individuate when internalized values or norms, such as
responsibility to outgroup members, become accessible. Making such internal values
accessible is predicted to attenuate the effects of power on impression formation and
lead to individuating impression formation strategies.
The remainder of this chapter addresses the specific definitions and theories
which motivated the present model. First, I will focus on defining power. Next I
will review the impression formation literature relevant to the present thesis.
Finally, I will address power in terms of one current model of impression formation,
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the continuum model, and show how this model provides for alternatives to the usual
effects of power.
Defining Power
Social scientists have long recognized the importance of power in
understanding human behavior and interaction. Yet definitions of power have made
little progress, and the concept has not been well-integrated into social psychology
(for reviews see Depret & Fiske, in press; Ng, 1981). Aside from a general sense that
"power involves influence through coercion" (Hollander, 1985), there appears to be
little consensus as to what constitutes power in social situations. Because the
present thesis concerns asymmetrical relationships between individuals and how
those relationships impact impression formation, a definition of power must address
the nature of the relationship between individuals.
Historically, power has been defined by exclusion. Early theorists concluded
that power was neither influence, prestige, eminence, competence, ability, nor
knowledge, since one could possess one or all of these characteristics without having
any power, or vice versa (Bierstedt, 1950). For example, consider an unpopular
President who has neither prestige nor competence but who, nevertheless, controls
the fate of billions by holding the key to a nuclear arsenal. Ambiguity
notwithstanding, these definitions of power also fail to address the relationships
between people, but instead focus on the characteristics of the individuals.
Others have approached power in terms of how people gain, or are perceived
to gain, their power. French and Raven (1959) defined a typology of five bases of
power: legitimate, reward, coercive, referent, and expert. These definitions
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distinguish, for example, people who have power because they have knowledge
(expert power) and people who have gained power via valid social mechanisms such
as elections (legitimate power). Wood (1973) went on to distinguish personal sources
of power (e.g., individual qualities) and structural sources of power (e.g., status).
Although these distinctions in how people gain and maintain their power are useful,
they too fail to address the nature of the relationship between powerful and less
powerful individuals.
At this point, it would be tempting to assume the general consensus and
define power in terms of social influence, the ability to alter another person's
thoughts, feelings, or actions. This definition does, after all, describe the relationship
between two individuals; one individual influences the other. Does social power
equal social influence? In a recent review of the power literature, Depret and Fiske
(1993) point out that such definitions of power lack heuristic value. Social influence
is the general concern of the whole of social psychology; how then can social
influence be power?
Instead, in the tradition of Thibaut and Kelley (1953), Depret and Fiske
assert the importance of the relationship, or links, between individuals in a given
situation (also see Riley & Fiske, 1991). The key to defining power then lies in
characterizing these links between individuals in terms of outcome control. For
example, when person A controls the outcomes of person B, then we can say person
A has social power over person B. This definition of power meets the proposed
criterion of addressing the nature of the relationship between individuals. Moreover,
this definition unconfounds social influence and social power. People who have
power control the outcomes of others, which in turn, may or may not influence the
thoughts, feelings, and actions of those people. Finally, this definition allows the
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description of power relationships in terms of symmetry. For example, if both
members of a dyad, A and B, control each other's outcomes equally, they share
symmetric amounts of power. However, if person A has complete control over
person B's outcomes, and person B does not control any outcomes for person A,
person A has asymmetrical power over person B. Again, it is the nature of the link
between the individuals, in this case the distribution of control, that defines power in
social situations. In summary, defining power in terms of outcome control will best
suit the current analysis of impression formation because it (1) addresses the nature
of the relationship between the people involved, (2) does not confound power with
influence, and (3) addresses the relative distribution, or asymmetry, of control in the
relationship.
Impression Formation: A Brief Review
Impression formation research has recently used models of interdependence to
explain how the relationships between individuals influence the ways that people
think about one another. Current models of impression formation maintain that
categorization is the default mode of impression formation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990). When we encounter social stimuli, we try to identify them in terms
of their category membership. This categorization process is relatively effortless,
involving the match between verbal labels or stimulus characteristics (e.g., hair and
eye color) and one's pre-existing categories (e.g., race). Once a category label has
been accessed, the content of schemas associated with the label may be activated.
For example, upon categorizing an alien from outer space as "Martian", schemas
associated with aliens from other planets may become accessible (e.g., their physical
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characteristics, their temperaments, etc.). A stereotype is a specific type of schema
that organizes information about members of socially defined groups of people, for
example, men, women, Asians, Caucasians, etc. (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The content
of these stereotypes, when activated, can organize and influence perception of a
stimulus person.
Categorization does not necessarily imply application of a stereotype. Before
a stereotype can be applied, it must be activated and accessible. If the stereotype is
undeveloped or weakly accessible, then it is unlikely that its contents will be applied
during impression formation. For example, consider John who knows only that
Martians are small green hominoids. John may be able accurately to apply the
category label "Martian" to little green creatures, but his stereotj^ie is so simple that
even if it were to be activated, it is unlikely to influence how he forms an impression
of a particular Martian. In contrast, assume that John has read a few science fiction
magazines and has a set of expectations about Martians. Upon encountering a
Martian, John's stereotype is likely to become more accessible. As a consequence,
the information in John's stereotype is likely to affect the way he forms an
impression of a particular Martian.
Schema-based impression formation is relatively automatic and involves
attending to the information that fits one's expectations about a category member.
Continuing the previous example, let's say that John's stereotype depicts Martians as
hostile, evil creatures who are trying to take over planet Earth. If John simply relies
on these expectations when forming an impression of a Martian, he will attend to
information that confirms his expectations (e.g., the Martian's body language was
"aggressive"). John would not especially notice information irrelevant to his
expectations (e.g., the Martian had three toes). In sum, categorization involves
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classifying a target, a process which may then access a schema, often a stereotype,
which in turn can guide the interpretation of information to confirm the schema.
People do not always use only their stereotypes when forming impressions
(Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Higgins & Bargh, 1985). Sometimes people
try to gather more information when forming impressions; they move beyond mere
category-based processing to individuation. Individuation is more effortful, requiring
more time and attention to information that goes beyond the initial categorization.
Returning to the previous example, John might attend not only to the Martian's
aggressive stance, but also to the fact that the creature brought gifts and sounded
calm. In this case, John is likely to attempt to make sense of the inconsistent
information (e.g., by thinking that because Martians are typically evil, this one may
be dissembling).
One key to individuation is motivation. Unless people are motivated to do
otherwise, they will rely on their initial categorizations when forming impressions.
What motivates people to move beyond categorization? Accuracy goals are
particularly good for motivating people to move beyond categorization. Research has
indicated that a number of factors can lead to accuracy goals, including
accountability, personal values, and interdependence (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). These
motives originate from three primary sources: the target of impression formation
(e.g., interdependence), the perceiver (e.g., personal values), or a third party (e.g.,
accountability).
According to Fiske and Neuberg (1990), when people are motivated to be
more accurate, they distinguish the most and least useful data. Information that
is
consistent with prior expectations is redundant and does not suggest a change
in the
impression. In contrast, category-inconsistent information is not redundant.
In fact,
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inconsistent information is unusual because it can disconfirm one's prior
expectations, suggesting that one might change one's overall expectation.
Inconsistent information is therefore more informative and can aid in forming a
more accurate impression. Accuracy goals can thus lead to a different type of
processing strategy in which the perceiver individuates the target, seeking
information that goes beyond the initial content of the schema. The continuum
model uniquely discusses relationships between people as a source of accuracy goals
hence it is most relevant to the discussion of power relationships.
Power and Accuracy in the Continuum Model
The continuum model of impression formation (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990)
addresses category-based and individuating impression formation strategies, and the
motivational factors that lead to each type of strategy. Recall that power is defined
in terms of asymmetrical outcome control. Research applying the continuum model
to a number of symmetrical outcome-dependent, or interdependent, task situations is
therefore of particular significance to the issue of power (for a review see Fiske &
Ruscher, 1989; see also Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher &
Fiske, 1990). These studies have usually made subjects dependent upon another
person's performance in order to gain some reward. According to the continuum
model these interdependent situations undermine people's sense of control; people
are motivated to gain some sense of prediction and control over their own
outcomes.
In turn, control motivation leads to accuracy goals in impression
formation.
Research has supported these ideas in both cooperative and competitive
interdependent situations. When people are in symmetrical interdependent
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relationships (i.e. when they have equal control over each other's outcomes), they
spend more time attending to category-inconsistent information, and they make more
dispositional inferences about that inconsistent information, in line with increasing
their sense of predictability. They also form more idiosyncratic impressions. These
strategies all are assumed to reflect a tendency to individuate.
Adopting an individuation strategy affords people the opportunity to enhance
their sense of prediction and control over their own outcomes. Consider a situation
in which two students are required to collaborate for a class presentation. Let's
assume that one of the students maintains an A average, and the other typically
makes C's. It is to each student's advantage to learn as much as possible about how
the other will likely perform on the task. Attending to inconsistent information
when forming an impression of a target allows a perceiver to better predict the
target's behavior because consistent information is redundant with prior expectations
but inconsistent information might change expectations. This process allows
perceivers to adjust their own behavior to improve the likelihood of gaining a desired
outcome. For example, upon learning that the honors student is also rushed and
superficial, the C student may decide to carry most of the responsibilities for
completing the project in order to increase the probability of receiving a high grade.
In summary, current views of impression formation hold that people tend to
use category-based strategies as default impression formation strategies. When
people want to predict and control their own outcomes, they tend to move beyond
categories and use individuating processes.
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Power and Imprftssjon Formatinn
How does power relate to current theories of impression formation? The
continuum model, as previously described, gives three sources for accuracy
motivation: the target, the perceiver, and third parties. As stated earlier, when the
perceiver is outeome-dependent upon the target, accuracy goals may be activated.
According to our definition of power, powerful perceivers are not outeome-dependent
on their targets. Therefore, powerful people are likely to use more category-based
impression formation strategies, unless the two remaining sources of motivation
intervene.
Powerful people may still be motivated either by their internal values, or by
accountability to some third party, providing incentives for them to individuate their
subordinates. For example, if a personal value to be "fair" is made salient, or if
powerful perceivers are concerned that others are judging the quality of decisions
about subordinates, they might be motivated to have accuracy goals. Of these two
sources of motivation, personal values are likely to be more potent motivators.
Personal values are apt to be central to the self (e.g., self-esteem, self-concept). As
such, they are likely to motivate accuracy goals in a fairly consistent way. In
contrast, accountability to a third party may depend on perceived characteristics of
the judge (e.g., personality, authority). Since perceptions of these characteristics may
vary considerably, and the perceiver's reactions depend on those perceptions (Tetlock
& Boettger, 1989), accountability to a third party may be a less stable source of
motivation for accuracy goals.
Limiting our consideration of motivators to personal values, there are many
possible alternatives to the usual effects of power. One plausible choice is
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responsibility. People who have a sense of responsibility for the impact of their
decisions may be motivated to individuate when forming impressions. The officially
shared values for responsibility to outgroups in our own culture suggest this
possibility. Most modern Western cultures officially hold that people are equal and
should be treated fairly, regardless of group membership. Perhaps increasing the
accessibility of these shared values of responsibility could motivate powerful people
to individuate.
General Hypotheses
The purpose of the present studies is to explore these issues in an
experimental setting. In Study 1, power and accessibility of responsibility values
were experimentally manipulated. I hypothesized that: (1) power allows category-
based impression formation strategies (main effect), (2) accessing responsibility
values makes subjects more likely to individuate (main effect), and (3) responsibility
values further moderate power effects, eliminating the difference between low and
high power (interaction).
Study 2 addressed implications of individual differences in domains relevant
to power and impression formation. In particular, it extended the examination of
power in impression formation to individual differences in need for dominance.
Individuals high in need for dominance want to control the outcomes of others (in
our terms, they want power). Hence, they spontaneously assume the role of
powerful
person, even when they are not explicitly given it. I anticipated that individuals
high
in need for dominance would use category-based impression formation
strategies, but
10
as in Study 1, 1 also predicted that these effects would be moderated
responsibility.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1: SITUATIONAL POWER
Overview and Design
The first study asked subjects to make decisions about fictitious job
applicants. Subjects were recruited under the pretense of assisting a local consulting
firm in the selection of high-school students for an area internship program.
Subjects participated in two rating sessions. Pilot testing of this study indicated that
the novelty of this task may make subjects somewhat self-conscious or overly
concerned with learning the task, which may interfere with the effectiveness of the
manipulations. I anticipated that the second session data might provide a more
accurate assessment of the effects of power and responsibility in this laboratory
setting.
The study employed a 2 (Power) x 2 (Responsibility) between-subjects
factorial design. Power was manipulated via subjects' perceived control over
selection of students (thirty percent control vs. none). Responsibility, operationalized
as accessibility of shared egalitarian values, was manipulated by priming subjects for
responsibility to outgroup members. I manipulated target ethnicity (Anglo, Hispanic)
and trait consistency (consistent, inconsistent) within subjects as well.
Dependent measures included measures of attention to trait information and
the coded content of subjects' verbal responses to this information (e.g., types of
attributions, elaborations, etc.). Attention to trait information was measured by
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timing subjects' verbal responses to the consistent and inconsistent trait information.
In addition, subjects rated each target on several impression related dimensions.
Patterns of Categorization and Individuation
Specific patterns of attention to information, verbal responses, and impression
ratings reflect different types of information processing and consequently different
impression formation strategies. The primary distinction between the two major
types of processing is manifest in contrasting patterns of attention to inconsistent
information. Low attention to inconsistent information is evidence of subjects* using
category-based processing. Individuation, on the other hand, is marked by subjects'
increasing attention to inconsistent information. Attention to consistent information
remains unchanged or decreases when subjects individuate.
With regard to the content of subjects' verbal responses, differences in
complexity distinguish the two impression formation strategies. Certain types of
verbal responses, such as simple repetition of the information and hedging, reflect
less complex or more cursory cognitive processing. These types of responses indicate
category-based processing. Other types of responses, such as making dispositional
inferences, or linking attributes, reflect more complex, effortful cognitive processing.
Dispositional inferences in particular reflect efforts to increase prediction and
control. These more complicated types of responses all denote individuating
processes.
Finally, differences in subjects' impression ratings also suggest different
processing strategies. Research using the interdependence paradigm has indicated
that although individuation involves attention to inconsistent information, this does
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not mean that subjects' final ratings will necessarily be moderated by attending to
this information. Instead, some subjecte use the information to disconfirm their
categories (thereby individuating), whereas others use it to reinforce their categories
(thereby polarizing their responses in the opposite direction). Thus categorization
and individuation can be distinguished by the variability across subjects* impression
ratings (Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). Low variability in impression ratings indicates
initial category-based responses. High variability in ratings indicates idiosyncratic
impression formation and hence is associated with individuating strategies.
H5T)otheses
These patterns of categorization and individuation suggest how power and
responsibility will affect attention, verbal responses, and impression ratings. Recall
the general h3T3otheses outlined at the end of Chapter 1. Two assumptions underlie
these predictions. The first assumption places as baseline the low-power/low-
responsibility condition. These subjects were assumed to be minimally involved in
the task because they neither have control nor feel particularly responsible for their
decisions. In effect, these subjects were assumed to be "going through the motions"
with little motivation to attend. As a result, these subjects were not expected to
distinguish between consistent and inconsistent information, and hence their
dependent measures should not reflect patterns of categorization or individuation.
The second assumption is that altering the level of motivation, either by increasing
their power or their sense of responsibility, would move them toward a particular
impression formation strategy. This assumption underlies the main effects
hypothesized for power and responsibility.
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Attention to Trait Information
More specifically, I predicted a main effect for power such that high-power
subjects would attend less to category-inconsistent information relative to low-power
subjects. I also predicted a main effect for accessibility of responsibility values, such
that high-responsibility subjects would attend more to inconsistent information,
relative to low-responsibility subjects, regardless of the power manipulation. Finally,
I predicted an interaction between power and responsibility such that responsibility
would moderate the effects of power on attention. More directly, high-power subjects
primed to access responsibility values should individuate, paying more attention to
category-inconsistent information than high-power/low-responsibility subjects.
Verbal Responses
I predicted the same main effects and interaction for power and responsibility
wdth regard to subjects' verbal responses to the trait information. A main effect for
power was predicted such that high-power subjects were expected to consider the
information in a more cursory fashion and make significantly fewer complex
responses (e.g., dispositional inferences) about the trait information. Low-power/low-
responsibility subjects were not expected to be involved in the task enough to exhibit
any overall differences in verbal response style. Accessibility of responsibility values
was expected to increase complex consideration of the information, leading subjects
in the high-responsibility condition to make significantly more complex verbal
responses. The predicted interaction between power and responsibility was expected
to moderate the effects of power on verbal responses. Thus, high-power subjects
primed for responsibility were expected to individuate, making more complex verbal
responses to the trait information.
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Impression Ratings
Predictions for subjects' impression ratings are somewhat different from the
previous hypotheses; these involve predicting variability in the impression ratings.
Subjects in the high-power/high-responsibility condition, who were expected to
individuate targets, were expected to make significantly more variable impression
ratings of the targets, relative to high-power/low-responsibility subjects. While I
expected low variability in the remaining three experimental cells, I was unsure
about the impression ratings for subjects in the low-power/high-responsibility cell.
These subjects could be motivated enough by the responsibility manipulation to
individuate, and hence show significant variability in their ratings. In this case there
could be a main effect for responsibility with regard to variability in impression
ratings. It is important to keep in mind when the analyses are discussed that these
last hypotheses are exploratory.
Method
Subjects
Sixty-three native English-speaking undergraduates were recruited from
introductory psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts. Subjects
received extra course credit for their participation in two experimental sessions. All
subjects were Anglo-Americans, except for one female Chinese-American whose data
were not included in the analyses. In addition, the verbal response data for two
subjects were lost due to problems with the recording device. The remaining data fc
these two subjects were not included in the present analyses.
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Of the sixty Anglo subjects for whom there were complete data, 51 cases were
included in the final analyses. Data from three subjects in the high-power/low-
responsibility condition were not included because the subjects appeared to have been
suspicious of the cover story. Additionally, the attention data were screened for
possible outliers. Six subjects who had timing scores three standard deviations above
or below the mean were considered outliers and excluded from the remaining
analyses.
Materials
Participant Information Questionnaire
This questionnaire contained a number of demographic questions and a
measure of subjects' confidence in their ability to evaluate the applicants. Previous
research using the interdependence paradigm has found that when subjects do not
feel competent about the task, they do not get invested in the procedure and they
tend to be insensitive to the information given to them about the target person
(Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). The self-reported measure of competence in this
questionnaire served to check for subjects who may have been too uncomfortable
wdth the task to be sensitive to the target information.
Applicant Folders
Subjects evaluated a total of six applicants. The first four applicants were
practice, or non-targets, intended to habituate subjects to the possibly novel task of
making decisions about someone else. Each folder contained an application form, six
trait information sentences, and a blank impression rating form.
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Application Form
All applicants were female high school seniors applying for generic clerical
positions. The application form was adapted from a standard job application and
included such items as previous work history, honors and awards, job related skills,
and references (see Appendix A). The target's ethnicity was indicated by the target's
name and, for Hispanic targets, their affiliation with an ethnic school organization.
For example, one Hispanic target was "Juanita Hernandez" who was a member of the
Spanish Students Association.
Of the four non-targets, three were Anglos and one was Hispanic.^ For the
last two applicants, the target applicants, order of ethnicity was randomized between
the two folders. Two application forms were developed for these two targets. Order
of presentation of these two forms was counterbalanced across treatment conditions
to account for any order effects.
Trait Information
The trait information sentences were presented on postmarked postcards
addressed to the experimenter. Subjects were told that the comments on these cards
had been written by employees who had worked with the students in the previous
year. The experimenter allegedly told the co-workers to mail them anonymously in
order to get the co-workers to respond freely. The twelve traits (half Anglo, half
Hispanic) were pretested and found to be uniquely representative of stereotypes for
Anglos and Hispanics(see Appendix B).^ The twelve traits were divided into four
groups, with three Anglo and three Hispanic traits in each group. As a result, each
trait group contained three consistent and three inconsistent traits; consistency
was
dependent upon the actual target race (see Appendix C). These trait groups
were
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randomized within subjects across the two rating sessions and counterbalanced to
prevent order effects.
Impression Rating Form
The impression rating form, or Candidate Rating Questionnaire (CRQ), is an
eight-item scale designed to assess subjects' perceptions of applicants' likability,
competence, and skill (see Appendix D). The final item asks subjects to indicate how
much they believe the applicant should be retained in the program. Each item was
composed of a question (e.g., "To what extent would you be excited to work with the
candidate?") followed by a six-inch blank line. Subjects indicated their responses to
each question by marking an "X" on the line (e.g., "Not at all excited....Ebctremely
excited"). This technique was employed in an attempt to deter subjects from
recalling their ratings of earlier targets and inhibit their ability to establish anchors
on which to base later ratings.
The Humanitarian-Egalitarian Values Scale
Subjects in the high-responsibility condition were primed for responsibility to
outgroup members with the Humanitarian-Egalitarian Values Scale (Katz & Haas,
1988). This ten-item scale was specifically developed to prime people to be
responsible to outgroup members (see Appendix D). In the present study, one item
was dropped on the basis that its content might make subjects suspicious about the
true nature of the study.'*
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Session Two Materials
As mentioned above, subjects returned to the laboratory for a second rating
session five to ten days after their first session. The stimulus materials for the
second rating session were identical to those of the first session with a few
alterations intended to reduce recognition. The applicant names and identification
numbers were changed, and the trait sentences were rephrased so as to maintain
their meaning while using the same traits as in Session One.
Subject Recruitment and the Cover Story
A confederate posing as a representative of a local consulting firm telephoned
students who expressed an interest during a classroom recruiting effort. The
confederate explained that the consulting firm was under contract with a local city to
assist in personnel-related decisions. Due to the current economic crunch, the city
had decided to reduce a number of public service programs, including an internship
program for high school students. The consulting firm was interested in getting
opinions from college students about the applicants for the internship program.
Interested students were scheduled to come to the lab for two applicant rating
sessions. The second session was always scheduled five to ten days after the first
session.
Session One Procedure
An experimenter, posing as a representative of the consulting firm, greeted
subjects and escorted them to a small laboratory room. The room was arranged to
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look like an office. Subjects were seated at an empty table and given an information
letter, typed on company letterhead. The letter reiterated the information subjects
were given when recruited, reminding them of the alleged purpose of their
participation. Subjects were told that they would be asked to review and evaluate
several high school students' applications for the internship program.
Upon giving written consent^ subjects completed the Participant Information
Questionnaire and read an additional information sheet. This information sheet
included the power manipulation. Subjects in the low-power condition read:
Your decisions will not afTect our decisions about which students to
retain in the program. We are interested in learning your opinions
about the student applicants because we believe that your opinions
could shed some light on better ways to evaluate applicants for such
positions.
In contrast, subjects in the high power condition were told that their evaluations
would:
...play a major role in determining whether or not each student will be
retained in the program. Your overall evaluation of each applicant will
be entered into a statistical equation and will account for 30% of the
final decision to retain the student or not.
As subjects were reading these materials, the experimenter placed a stack of
applicant folders on the table in front of the subject. Next the experimenter
explained the contents of a sample applicant folder. Subjects were shown blank
materials and instructed as to the proper way to mark their responses on the CRQ.
At this point, the experimenter explained to subjects that the firm was also
interested in their reactions to the materials and how they came up with their
decisions about the applicants. Subjects were asked to "think aloud" while they
reviewed each applicant folder. Subjects were told that their responses would be
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audio-recorded as it would be too difficult for the experimenter to take dictation from
their responses.
The experimenter requested that subjects read aloud any information on the
application form that seemed important to them for any reason and to indicate why
they thought the information was important. Subjects were also instructed to read
aloud the trait sentence postcards and, upon reading each card, to say aloud
whatever came to mind about the card as it pertained to the applicant. The
experimenter emphasized the importance of responding to each card.®
After the experimenter explained how to operate the recording device,
subjects in the high-responsibility condition completed the Humanitarian-Egalitarian
Values Scale. The experimenter told these subjects that:
There is some research to indicate that people with a high sense of
responsibility are more suited for this task. As an aside to our job here
today, we are collecting some data on this. You might say we're killing
two birds with one stone while we have you here. If you don't mind,
just fill out this brief questionnaire and we'll get started.
All subjects were reminded again of their control over the selection of the
students (thirtypercent of the decision or none) prior to reviewing the applicants.
When subjects had completed the sixth application, which was the second target
application, the experimenter called time and stopped the subjects from evaluating
the remaining folders. Before leaving, subjects were reminded of their second
appointment, asked to maintain confidentiality, and dismissed from the laboratory.
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Session Two Procedure
When subjects arrived for the second rating session they were briefly
reminded of the cover story, asked to sign a second consent form, and then re-read
the power manipulation form. The experimenter briefly reviewed the think-aloud
directions, demonstrating with the sample folder. Under the pretense that their
original answers had been misplaced, subjects in the high-responsibility condition
were again asked to complete the Humanitarian-Egalitarian Values Scale prior to
evaluating the applicants. As in session one, the experimenter interrupted subjects
once they had completed the final target folder.
After subjects completed the evaluations, they answered a final questionnaire
which included a few items to check the credibility of the cover story and the
effectiveness of the responsibility manipulation. Subjects were then carefully
debriefed. Because subjects were not told the true purpose of the study prior to
giving consent, they were given the option to remove any materials that they had
provided. The experimenter gave special attention to assuring that subjects were not
negatively effected by the deception. Finally, subjects were given credit for
participation.
Analyses
Unfortunately, there were significant problems with the subjects' Day 2 data.
Subjects were very suspicious the second time they arrived at the laboratory to make
the evaluations. All but a few subjects recognized the Day 2 materials as those of th<
first day. They did not always realize that the names were changed; but they
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frequently commented that they were sure they had "done this one before." For this
reason, I decided not to analyze the Day 2 data. All analyses in the following section
refer only to subjects' performance on the first day of evaluations.
Attention Measures
Subjects' audio-recorded verbal responses were transcribed and then timed to
the hundredth of a second. The timing data were submitted to a mixed-design
ANOVA, with power and responsibility as the between-subjects independent
variables, and with target ethnicity and trait consistency as within-subjects variables.
This analysis yielded two significant two-way interactions, but no main effects.
First, as Figure 2 indicates, the analysis revealed the predicted two-way
interaction between power and responsibility, F(l,47)=5.07, p=.02. In the low
responsibility conditions, power decreased overall attention to the targets, as
predicted. But priming responsibility reversed this effect. As expected, responsibility
moderated the effects of power, making the powerful more attentive. However, we
had predicted that responsibility would equalize the two power conditions. Instead,
there was one anomalous cell, high-responsibility/low-power; I will return to this
later.
A second two-way interaction occurred between power and target ethnicity
(Figure 3), such that subjects who had power attended significantly more to the
ingroup (Anglo) targets than did their low-power counterparts, F(l,47)=4.25, ^=-04.
Relative differences in attention to Hispanic versus Anglo targets were not
significant for either the low-power (t(26)=1.25, e>.05) or the high-power group
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(t(25)=-1.68, E>.05). However the significant increase in attention to the Anglo
targets may indicate an ingroup bias under high power.
Contrary to the hypotheses, there were no effects for trait consistency.
Subjects did not differentiate between category-consistent and
-inconsistent
information.
Yet these data still somewhat support the idea that power undermines overall
attention during impression formation. Under low responsibility, having power
reduces attention. On the surface, this decrease in attention contradicts a basic
premise of the continuum model. According to the model, subjects in the baseline
condition, low-power/low-responsibility, should default to categorization processes,
and hence should have the same attention pattern as subjects in the high-power/low-
responsibility condition. Why then do these baseline (low-low) subjects have higher
attention scores than the subjects who are given power but no responsibility
manipulation? Subjects in the baseline condition may be categorizing targets; their
attention scores were significantly lower than subjects who were presumably
individuating (high-high). Given the fact that subjects are in an experimental setting
and have been handed the materials by the alleged consultant, there is demand to
pay some attention to the materials, even in the baseline condition. When subjects
are given power, however, their attention to the materials drops below the baseline
condition. Thus, subjects with power may be categorizing even more than subjects in
the baseline condition.
The interaction between power and responsibility was qualified by an ingroup
bias. Subjects' attention to the Anglo target was significantly higher when they had
power to control the target's outcomes. Attention to Hispanic targets did not
change
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when subjects were given power, further supporting the possibility of an ingroup
bias.
Verbal Response Measures
Subjects' verbal responses to trait information were carefully transcribed.
Judges, blind to condition and target ethnicity, coded the sentences according to a
previously established coding scheme (Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). Responses were
coded into seven discrete categories: matching attribute to attribute, dispositional
inferences, elaborations, evaluations, hedging, no comment, repetition, and
dispositional elaborations (Table 1). Judges cross-coded scores for thirty-six
responses. These scores were submitted to a test of inter-rater reliability which
revealed no significant difference in the judges' coding. Kappa coefficients ranged
from Kappa=.71 for dispositional inferences to Kappa=.91 for evaluations, with a
median Kappa=.81.
Next, the judges tallied the coded responses for each subject according to
category response types, target ethnicity, and the type of trait sentence (consistent,
inconsistent). For example, each subject had a score for the number of dispositional
responses made about inconsistent information for each target. Descriptive analyses
of these scores revealed that fewer than ten percent of the responses fell into the
following categories: attribute matching, repetition, dispositional elaborations, and no
comment. The tallied scores for the four remaining categories were submitted to a
mixed-design ANOVA, again using power and responsibility as the between-subjects
independent variables, with target ethnicity and trait consistency as within-subjects
variables. These analyses revealed no significant results to indicate that any single
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type of response was responsible for the attention data results. There were however
several negativity effects (Table 2). The design of the study crossed ethnicity with
trait consistency to unconfound trait consistency and trait valence. So, for Hispanic
targets, the inconsistent information was positive, and vice versa for Anglo targets.
The ethnicity x consistency effects indicate a negativity bias, such that subjects not
only hedged more, but also made more evaluations, more elaborations, and more
dispositional attributions in response to negative information.
Impression Ratings
Subjects' responses to the eight impression rating items were measured to the
tenth of an inch. These scores were submitted to a factor analysis using varimax
rotation that indicated a single factor solution accounting for 26.46% of the variance.
The item scores were then summed for each target and submitted to Levene's test
for homogeneity of variance.
For Hispanic targets the homogeneity analysis revealed no effects for power,
responsibility, or the interaction between the two. Subjects* overall impression
ratings of Hispanic targets were about equally variable in all conditions (5^= 42.49).
Analysis of the variability of subjects' overall impression ratings of Anglo
targets, however, revealed a significant interaction between power and responsibility,
F(l,52)=4.69, E=.03. High power decreased the variability in subjects' ratings
(a2=37.33), as compared to subjects in the low-power conditions (a2=45.81).
Responsibility however, is moderating this effect. While subjects in the high-
power/low-responsibility condition had the least variable ratings (^2= 16.83), high-
power subjects who received the responsibility manipulation had the most variable
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ratings(a2=57.84). These homogeneity effects precluded submitting these scores to
ANOVA.
This pattern fits the expectation that subjects with high power would form
less individuated and idiosyncratic impressions unless they were given the
responsibility manipulation, at least for Anglo targets. However, we did not
anticipate variability in impressions to differ by ethnicity. It is plausible that the
aforementioned ingroup attention bias is related to these differences in impression
variability.
Other Measures and Analyses
Just prior to debriefing, subjects were asked to evaluate their own accuracy in
performing the job selection task, the helpfulness of the trait information, and how
responsible they felt. Analyses of these data revealed no significant group effects.
Even though the responsibility manipulation interacted with the power manipulation
to influence subjects' overall attention and variability of impression ratings, subjects
reported feeling equally responsible for their evaluations regardless of the
responsibility manipulation. Given the other results, it is possible that subjects
simply responded in a socially acceptable way to this manipulation check question;
their responses leaned toward the upper end of the scale (X=7.19, sd=2.29).
Summary and Conclusion
As predicted, power and responsibility had a significant impact on the
impression formation strategies employed by subjects who entered into this job
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selection task. Under low responsibility, subjects who were given control over the
outcomes of the targets paid less attention to information than subjects who did not
believe they had any control over the outcomes, as predicted. This effect was
moderated by the responsibility manipulation, but not precisely as expected. High-
power subjects did attend more to target information when responsibility values had
been primed than when they were not primed. But low-power/high-responsibility
subjects attended far less than expected. High-power/low-responsibility subjects
tended to make the least individuated, least variable impression ratings, but only for
Anglo targets. Subjects made more individuated, variable impression ratings when
given the responsibility manipulation, especially when they also had high power.
The pattern of results suggests that power and responsibility are important
determinants of impression formation strategies. However, contrary to expectations,
subjects did not discriminate between consistent and inconsistent information when
attending to the targets. Therefore, the full criteria for categorization and
individuation were not met. There are two plausible explanations for this non-result.
Subjects could have failed to discriminate between the two types of information
simply because the sentences were not clearly category-consistent or -inconsistent
given the context of the job evaluation situation. In other words, while the traits
used in the sentences were pretested to be uniquely consistent or inconsistent with
stereotypes of the two ethnic groups, the sentences may have implied connotations
which decreased the distinction between the two groups. To determine if this was
the case, a post-test survey of the sentences was conducted. Eighteen
undergraduates were asked to rate how well the twelve sentences fit "our cultural
stereotypes" of Anglo and Hispanic people. A between-subjects design was employed,
such that half of the subjects rated the sentences for Anglos and half of the subjects
30
rated the sentences for Hispanics. Ratings for each sentence were analyzed using a
between groups t-test. The results indicate that, except for one item, subjects were
able to accurately determine which trait sentences were consistent and inconsistent
with the two ethnic groups (e<.05). Subjects failed to distinguish between groups
only for the "radical" trait sentence. Since this is an unusual trait to mention in a
work context it is not surprising that subjects had difficulty interpreting this one.
Another possibility is that poorly developed stereotypes were responsible for
the present results. Many students in this area of the country are relatively
underexposed to Hispanic people. In fact, their low salience status in the immediate
community was a key criterion for choosing Hispanics to be the outgroup targets. I
believed subjects would be less suspicious of the experimental situation and, hence,
would be less likely to behave in a "politically correct" manner if a less salient
outgroup was chosen. Unfortunately, this also meant that, on average, subjects may
have had less developed and less rigid stereotypes for this particular outgroup. As
mentioned before, the continuum model maintains that the stereotype must be
accessible to influence impression formation.
Individual differences in factors related to the development and maintenance
of stereotypes should predict when people distinguish between consistent and
inconsistent information about a low salience outgroup member. People who are
relatively high on such dimensions as authoritarianism, dogmatism, dominance,
cognitive rigidity, and racism should be more likely to distinguish between category
consistent and inconsistent information, when compared to people who are low on
these dimensions. Addressing this issue was one purpose of Study 2.
Returning to the attention measure analyses, the mean for the low-
power/high-responsibility cell was not as predicted. Instead of increasing attention,
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responsibility led low-power subjects to pay less attention to target information. At
present there is no explanation for this result. One can speculate, however, about
the relationship between the concepts of power and responsibility. Recall that there
was an interaction between power and responsibility, but no main effects for these
variables. So, power without responsibility leads to categorization, and power with
responsibility motivates subjects to individuate, as predicted. However, this does not
necessitate the same relationship between the two concepts in the absence of power.
It is possible that without power, i.e., without control, having responsibility
has a different meaning for subjects and hence precipitates very different
motivations. For example, if you are forming an impression of someone and know
that your evaluations can have no impact on the outcomes for that person, feeling
responsible could actually be aversive. Let's assume you find out something about
the targets of your evaluations that leads you to form a positive impression. Feeling
responsible connotes a desire to act, in this example, perhaps a desire to act on their
behalf to help them gain their just rewards. Wanting to act and not being able to
may result in dissonance. To resolve this dissonance, one need only do one thing:
stop paying attention to the persons being evaluated. The less you know about a
person, the less aversive it would be to make an evaluation that you know will have
no impact. In other words, it could be that the subjects in the study who had no
power were motivated to be responsible by the responsibility manipulation, but being
unable to control the situation, they "gave up" and stopped paying attention to the
targets.
Before moving on to Study 2, there is a noteworthy problem with the design
of the present study. I failed to create a fully comparable control for the
manipulation of shared values of responsibility. Since subjects in the low-
32
responsibility condition neither completed a questionnaire nor received any
instructions about what kind of person was suited for the task, it is not possible to
conclude definitely that the responsibility manipulation was actually responsible for
the observed effects. There could have been something about the directions given to
high-responsibility subjects that changed how they attended to target information.
There is no way to address this problem in the present analyses. Steps were taken
to correct for this potential confound in the second study (as well as in a follow-up
being conducted this semester).
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Attention to Trait Information
Power X Responsibility Interaction
Attention (sees)
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F(l,47) = 5.07, p<.05
FIGURE 2: Study 1 - Overall attention to information by powe
and responsibility.
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Attention to Trait Information
Power X Ethnicity Interaction
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F(l,47)= 4.25, p<.05
FIGURE 3: Study 1 - Overall attention to information by power
and target ethnicity.
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Table 1. Categories for content coding of verbal responses.
Coding Category Defined
Matching Attributes
Dispositional Inference
Elaborations
Dispositional Elaborations
Evaluations
Hedging
No Comment
Information matched to prior
attribute of the target: e.g., "That
doesn't fit with an educated
person."
Statement about the target's traits,
preferences, etc: e.g., "She's the
kind of person who likes to be
organized."
Inference or explanation of the
trait, or who said it: e.g., "That
sounds like [the author] didn't like
her."
Elaborations that have some
indication of dispositional
inference, but unclear: e.g., "That
comment shows lack of confidence."
Evaluation of trait without
interpretation: e.g., "That's good."
Filler comments, speech stumbles
not directed at an3d;hing particular:
e.g." uh..the-that.."
Subject makes or says "no
comment"
Repetition Repeat or paraphrase trait or
sentence.
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^St^^L
^ ^ ethnicity effect, for verbal responses in
Coding Category f (1,52)
Hedging 15.86
Elaborations 17.77
Evaluations 27.57
<.01
Dispositional Inferences 4.79 < 05
<.001
<.001
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2: DOMINANCE
Overview and Dpsi gn
Study 1 manipulated power situationally by altering subjects' beliefs in how
much control they had over the hiring decisions. In the real world there are often
situations that are not clearly defined in terms of who has how much power over
whom. Often, people do not know exactly how much control they have. An example
of this occurs in academic settings when graduate students are asked to evaluate new
faculty applying to their departmente. It is clear that the studente have some
control, or else they would not be polled. However, it is unclear how much influence
their evaluations will have or how they would otherwise impact the hiring decision.
Ambiguous power situations afford the opportunity for individuals to impose their
own expectations about controlling outeomes. It is here that individual differences in
how people perceive their own power may impact the impression formation process.
One purpose of Study 2 was to explore how these individual differences might
influence the strategies people use when forming impressions.
As mentioned in regard to the findings of Study 1, a second purpose of Study
2 was to address the possibility that individual differences in the development and
maintenance of stereotypes might influence when people are able to discriminate
between category-consistent and -inconsistent information when forming an
impression. If people are unable to distinguish between the two types of information
it will be hard to determine if people are individuating or categorizing when they
form an impression.
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One potential individual difference is particularly relevant to the issue of
power and impression formation; namely the trait analog for situational power, need
for dominance. Surprisingly little research has addressed the issue of dominance in
impression formation (Battistich, Assor, Messe, & Aronoff, 1985). Much of the
research exploring personality variables in the context of person perception has
focused on variables related to the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954), and dogmatism (Robbins,
1974; Taylor & Dunnette, 1974). From these studies we know that dogmatic subjects
form impressions much more quickly than do non-dogmatic subjects (Taylor &
Dunnette, 1974) and that they take in less information before passing judgment
(Robbins, 1974). As for dominance, we only know that dominance interacts with
target status when perceivers rate targets (Battistich et al., 1985). High-status
individuals rate high-status targets less favorably than they do low-status targets,
and low-dominance individuals do exactly the opposite. To date, there is no research
addressing the effects of need for dominance on the strategies that people use when
forming impressions of less powerful others.
How will need for dominance affect the impression formation process?
Burger and Cooper (1979) assert that personality variables only impact impression
formation when the perceiver has an investment (e.g., is outcome dependent, or
implicates one's self-esteem) in the interaction with the target. In other words,
people need investment to activate these aspects of the self-concept in a way that
influences the impression formation process. According to this perspective, people
with asymmetrical power, who are not at all outcome dependent, would not be
influenced by need for dominance.
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Nevertheless, I will argue that while people with power do not have outcomes
dependent upon the targets of their decisions, the situation is of great personal
relevance to the dominance trait dimension, so much so that it will indeed impact the
impression formation strategies that they choose. If this is the case, high-dominance
individuals will behave as though they have power, even when they have been given
no specific control over decisions. As a result, high-dominance individuals should be
predisposed to use category-based modes of impression formation. In contrast, low-
dominance individuals, interpreting situations as though they have no control over
outcomes, should not assume control in ambiguous situations and should be more
likely to use more individuating impression formation strategies.
In Study 2, subjects were preselected on the basis of individual differences in
need for dominance and participated in the same job selection task described in
Study 1. Responsibility was manipulated using the same technique as in Study 1,
with the addition of a control questionnaire. Also, the phrasing used by the
experimenter to introduce the manipulation was altered (as detailed later).
The study involved a 2 (Need for Dominance: high vs. low) x 2
(Responsibility: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design. As in Study 1, target
ethnicity and trait consistency were manipulated within-subjects.
H3T)otheses were the same as Study 1, with need for dominance mimicking
power in this study. Regarding the attention measures, I expected main effects for
dominance and responsibility, as well as an interaction between the two variables.
People high in need for dominance should be more likely to use category-based
modes of impression formation, but this effect should be moderated by accessibility of
responsibility to outgroup members. High need-for-dominance subjects should spend
less time attending to category-inconsistent information than low-dominance
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subjects. Subjects who receive the high-responsibility manipulation, however, should
spend more time attending to category-inconsistent information, relative to subjects
who receive the control responsibility manipulation, regardless of their dominance
group. Again, the effects of dominance were expected to be moderated by
responsibility such that high
-dominance subjects would attend more to inconsistent
information when given the high-responsibility manipulation.
Subjects' verbal responses were again expected to reflect levels of processing
consistent with individuation and categorization depending upon subjects' need for
dominance and the responsibility manipulation. High-dominance subjects should
make fewer dispositional inferences than low-dominance subjects, unless they receive
the high-responsibility manipulation.
Impression ratings were also expected to respond as predicted for Study 1
with high-dominance subjects making less variable ratings of outgroup members.
Responsibility also was expected to increase variability in subjects' ratings of targets.
Method
Subjects
Sixty-four native English-speaking undergraduates were recruited from
introductory psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts. Subjects
received extra course credit for their participation.
All subjects participated in a mandatory pre-testing session at the beginning
of the semester. During this pretesting session students completed the Dominance
Scale of the California Psychological Inventory, CPI, (Gough, 1969; see Appendix E)
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and the Modern Racism Scale, MRS (McConahay, 1983; see Appendix F). The CPI
Dominance-Scale is a thirty-six item measure designed to assess individual
differences in need for dominance. The scale has shown adequate reliability (a=.79)
in previous research and has been validated on a number of diverse samples (Gough,
1987). Students who scored in the upper and lower 30% on the CPI Dominance
Scale were eligible for participation in this study. The MRS is a thirty-two item
scale designed to assess racism in a non-threatening way. I intended to use subjects'
scores on the MRS in the analyses to control for individual differences in racism.''
Of the original sixty-four participants in the study, data for eight subjects
were dropped before analysis. Data for three subjects were incomplete due to a
malfunctioning of the audio-recording equipment. Data for four subjects were
dropped because the subjects indicated unusual suspicion about the cover story.
Three of these subjects were from the high-dominance sample, one from the low-
dominance sample. Finally, screening the subjects' responses to the high-
responsibility manipulation questionnaire indicated that one subject scored more
than three standard deviations below the mean on this questionnaire. Since it is
likely that the manipulation did not work on this subject, that subject's scores were
also removed from the data set. The resulting data set included fifty-six subjects, 15
men and 41 women, distributed in equal proportions among the groups.
Procedure
The cover story, recruiting, and experimental procedures followed those of
Study 1 with a few exceptions: First, subjects participated in only one rating session,
evaluating six applicants, as in the first session of Study 1.
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Second, there was no manipulation of power, as this study was concerned
with individual differences in need for dominance. Instead, all subjects were told
that the firm was "interested in their opinions in order to get ideas for better ways to
evaluate high school students for intern positions." This manipulation was similar to
the low-power manipulation in Study 1, except that here subjects were not given any
further indication as to how their responses might be used in the selection process.
This situation was intended to be fairly ambiguous with regard to amount of control
over outcomes and thus allows us to attribute differences in impression formation
strategies due to individual differences in need for dominance.
Third, the responsibility manipulation was corrected to eliminate the
confound of Study 1. Subjects in both responsibility conditions answered a
questionnaire. Subjects in the high-responsibility condition completed the
Humanitarian-Egalitarian Values Scale as in Study 1. Subjects in the low-
responsibility condition completed a filler questionnaire containing an equal number
of irrelevant statements that subjects were asked to endorse on a 6-point scale (e.g.,
"There is not enough emphasis on the arts in our education system"; see Appendix
G). As mentioned before, the way that the questionnaire was introduced was also
altered, in order to reduce possible demand characteristics. The experiementer
introduced the questionnaire as an afterthought, expressing a look of surprise at
having "forgotten" to give subjects the questionnaire before explaining the
procedures. All subjects, regardless of condition, were told that the questionnaire
was a part of another unrelated study. The studies were allegedly combined in order
to fill the time quota necessary for subjects to receive two full credits for
participation. Subjects were asked if they would mind completing the questionnaire
before they began their evaluations, supposedly because the experimenter did not
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want them to run out of time to complete it. All subjects agreed and completed the
questionnaire at this point in the procedure. Upon completing the target ratings,
subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire that included manipulation
checks. Subjects were then carefully debriefed and given credit for their
participation.
Analyses
Attention Measures
Subjects' verbal responses to the target trait information were timed and
entered into a mixed design ANOVA, as in Study 1, The analysis generated the
predicted two-way interaction (Figure 4) between dominance and consistency of
information, F(l,52)=3.92, £=.05, with the predicted pattern. For low-dominance
subjects, attention to consistent and inconsistent information was equivalent, t(28)=-
.37, E>.10, but high-dominance subjects focused significantly more on the category-
confirming consistent information, t(26)=2.72, p<.01.
Additionally, there was a two-way interaction between Target Ethnicity and
Consistency such that subjects spent more time attending to negative information,
F(l,52) = 18.23, p=.00. Contrary to expectations, the responsibility manipulation had
no effect on subjects' attention to trait information. Unlike Study 1, there was no
interaction between responsibility and dominance, the dispositional power
manipulation in this study. It is possible that the responsibility manipulation was
too weak to override extreme individual differences in dominance.
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Verbal Response Measures
Subjects' verbal responses were transcribed and coded as in Study l.«
Initial analyses indicated that fewer than 10% of the responses fell into the
following coding categories: attribute matching, repetition, and dispositional
elaborations. These categories were not considered in the remaining analyses.
Correlational analyses revealed that the driving force behind the attention
data appears to be subjects' elaborations about trait information, r =
.64, 2< 001.
There was a significant interaction between dominance and consistency of
information for the number of elaborations subjects made about the information
(Figure 5), F(l,52)=5.54, £=.02. High-dominance subjects elaborated more about
consistent information (e.g., in response to the trait "loud" one subject replied "they
should ask her to be quiet"), while low-dominance subjects did not show a difference
in elaboration responses to these two types of information.
Analyses of dispositional inferences likewise revealed a marginal interaction
between dominance and consistency of information, F(l,52)=3.34, £=.07. This effect
was not in the predicted direction. Whereas I anticipated high-dominance subjects to
make fewer dispositional inferences, the reverse pattern occurred. High-dominance
subjects made more dispositional inferences (e.g., in response to the trait "loud," one
subject replied "she likes to talk"), and they made them about inconsistent trait
information, while low-dominance subjects made more dispositional inferences about
consistent trait information.
This analysis also revealed a three-way interaction (Figure 6) between
dominance, responsibility, and trait consistency for number of dispositional
inferences, F(1,52)=5.71,e=.02. Under low responsibility, high-dominance subjects
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made more dispositional attributions about inconsistent trait information, while low-
dominance subjects made more dispositional attributions to consistent trait
information. Under high responsibility, this effect was dramatically different; both
high- and low-dominance subjects made more dispositional attributions about
inconsistent information, but low-dominance subjects made more dispositional
attributions overall, relative to high-dominance subjects. As mentioned above, these
results contradict what was predicted according to the Continuum Model. According
to the model, individuals who are confirming their categories by attending to
category-consistent information, as the high-dominance subjects were doing, should
make fewer dispositional inferences. In an effort to understand what the present
results meant about the way subjects were processing the information, I went back to
the dispositional responses and divided them into groups for further examination.
Although the number of dispositional responses was too small to submit to further
statistical analysis, examination of the types of specific comments made by these
subjects suggests that high-dominance subjects may have been moderating the
negativity of information when evaluating negative information for the ingroup
target, but exaggerating the negativity of information for outgroup targets. For
example, in response to the trait "emotional" for the Hispanic target, one high-
dominance low-responsibility subject replied "she may be a whiner." In response to
the same trait about the Anglo target, one subject responded "she may be too young."
In addition, subjects' responses to inconsistent information for Anglo targets tended
to include a number of modifying adjectives that moderated the negativity of the trait
information (e.g., "a little irresponsible", "she seems to be sensitive"). These
modifiers were not as prevalent in responses to consistent (negative) information
about Hispanic targets, but they did appear in response to inconsistent (positive)
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information about Hispanic targets (e.g., "I guess she's respectful," "looks like she's
ambitious"). In the future, I plan to develop a coding category to more adequately
capture this potential difference in subjects' responses.
Finally, analysis of the number of evaluations of the trait information
revealed a significant three-way interaction between dominance, responsibility, and
consistency of information (Figure 7), F(l,52)=4.03, e<.04. Under low
responsibility, low-dominance subjects were more evaluative, especially of
inconsistent trait information. High-dominance subjects did not make many
evaluative responses under low responsibility nor did they differentiate between
types of trait information. As with the elaborative responses, however, this pattern
reversed under high responsibility. Low-dominance subjects became much less
evaluative when given the high-responsibility manipulation, whereas high-dominance
subjects became more evaluative, especially of inconsistent target information. This
finding may indicate that responsibility means different things to low-dominance
individuals compared to high-dominance individuals.
Impression Ratings
Subjects* impression ratings were measured and analyzed as in Study 1. The
ratings were factor analyzed as before. The analysis revealed that these individual
items did not load on any one factor in any theoretically meaningful way. Since
these items did not appear to contribute to a single factor, I decided to analyze each
item separately, in contrast to summing the items as in Study 1. I submitted the
item ratings for each target individually to Levene's test for homogeneity of variance.
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The pattern of resulte was consistent with the predictions regarding idiosyncratic
impression formation.
Hispanic Tar^t Ratings
For Hispanic targets, the analyses revealed two significant differences in the
variabiUty of subjects' ratings. First, for the ratings of how "irritating" subjects
found the target, there was a main effect for power, F(l,52)=4.17, e<.05, and a main
effect for responsibiUty, F(l,52) = 11.53, £<.001. When subjects had low power, they
made more variable ratings on this item. Subjects also made more variable ratings
when they were given the high responsibility manipulation. Subjects in the high-
dominance low-responsibility condition had the least variability in their ratings.
Second, variability in subjects' ratings of the targets' "skill" level differed
significantly by dominance group, F(l,52)=4.66, p<.05. Low-dominance subjects had
more variable ratings than high-dominance subjects. Subjects' ratings on this item
were most variable when they were in the high-dominance high-responsibility
condition.
These findings are consistent with previous research and indicate a pattern of
individuation associated with more idios3nicratic ratings. High-dominance subjects
tended to rate Hispanic subjects in less idiosjmcratic ways, with responsibility
increasing variability in ratings as predicted.
Anglo Target Ratings
The homogeneity of variance analyses produced similar patterns of
idiosyncratic impression formation for Anglo targets, with two significant effects.
Again, the variability of subjects' ratings of how "irritating' they found the target
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were significantly infiuenced by dominance, F(l,52)=3.84, e<.05. Low-dominance
subjects made more variable ratings than high-dominance subjects. Subjects' ratings
of the Anglo target's "competence" were significantly influenced by the responsibility
manipulation such that high-responsibility subjects made more variable ratings of
target competence, F(l,52)=6.31, e<.01.
These findings are again consistent with the expectations that dominance and
responsibility influence the variability of impressions, reflecting patterns of
individuation and categorization. When subjects were expected to use category-based
impression formation strategies about the Anglo target, they also tended to make less
variable impression ratings of the target.
Other Measures
Subjects again were asked to complete a series of short questions prior to
debriefing. Since responsibility failed to influence the attention measure, it is not
surprising that the manipulation check for responsibility failed to reach significance.
Once again, there were no differences in subjects' ratings of how helpful they found
the trait information or how accurate their ratings were.
Summary and Conclusion
As predicted, individual differences in need for dominance influenced how
subjects attended to and processed information about others in ambiguous power
situations. However, responsibility did not moderate the effect. In this study, high-
dominance subjects were more likely to adopt category-based attention processes
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when forming impressions, attending to category-confirming consistent information
about targets. In contrast, low-dominance subjects did not attend more to either
consistent or inconsistent trait information when evaluating targets. One could
hypothesize that low-dominance subjects were merely uninvolved and hence, they did
not distinguish because they were only attending to the stimuli minimally. If this
were the case, one would expect low-dominance subjects to pay less attention overall
to target information than high-dominance subjects, when in fact there were no
differences in overall attention between the two groups. This leaves one to
speculate that low-dominance subjects may have in fact had less developed
stereotypes, or else they were less willing to apply their stereotypes. In either case,
it is important that high-dominance subjects had no problem distinguishing between
the two types of information.
Perhaps the most startling findings of this experiment were related to
subjects' verbal responses about target trait information. Previous research has
consistently found that dispositional inference responses are associated with
individuating attentional strategies. In other words, people pay attention to
inconsistent information, and they make dispositional inferences about that
information. I found the opposite. In this study, high-dominance subjects, who were
attending more to consistent information, were more likely to make dispositional
inferences about the inconsistent trait information. At present there is no clear
explanation for this finding, although, as mentioned before, it is possible that
subjects made dispositional inferences that allowed them to confirm their
expectations about targets.
Subjects' impression ratings were more variable under conditions reflecting
individuation. Overall, high-dominance subjects tended to make less idiosyncratic
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ratings of targets. Priming subjects for responsibility values tended to increase
variability in target ratings. However, it is disappointing that subjects' ratings did
not load on a single factor, preventing interpretation of subjects' overall impression
ratings as in Study 1. In the future it will be important to try and replicate this
pattern of results to determine its reliability.
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Attention to Trait Information
Dominance x Consistency Interaction
Attention (sees)
43 n
42 -
41 -
40 -
39 -
38 -
Low High
Dominance
Information Type
Consistent ' Inconsistent
F(l,52) = 3.92, p<.05
FIGURE 4: Study 2 - Attention to information by dominance
and trait consistency.
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Elaboration Responses to Traits
Dominance x Consistency Interaction
Number of Responses
Low High
Dominance
Information Type
Consistent ' Inconsistent
F(l,53) = 5.54, p<.05
FIGURE 5: Study 2 - Number of elaborative responses by dominance
and trait consistency.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Taken together, the results of these two studies indicate that power, whether
real (Study 1) or desired (Study 2) has a significant influence on how people attend
to and process information about others. Responsibility also plays an important role
in the process, moderating the effects of at least situational power as in Study 1.
The fact that the responsibility manipulation did not replicate across the two studies
is something of a concern since Study 2 attempted to rule out a possible confound in
this manipulation in Study 1. This problem is presently being addressed in a follow-
up study. Assuming the responsibility manipulation works in this follow-up study,
one can conclude that the null results of Study 2 were due to the powerful influence
of the extreme individual differences between the two dominance groups.
The attention results, on the other hand, did behave mostly as expected
across the two studies. In the first study, the situational manipulation of power
interacted with responsibility to influence subjects' overall attention to trait
information. However, there was one problematic cell: low-power/high-responsibility.
As discussed following the results of Study 1, subjects in this cell were not expected
to decrease attention. It is possible that responsibility has a different meaning for
subjects who have no control over targets' outcomes. The analyses of subjects' verbal
responses in Study 2 suggest that low-dominance subjects become less evaluative but
make more dispositional inferences under high responsibility. The reverse was true
for high-dominance subjects. This hints at the possibility that there may be different
social rules for making these judgments, given different amounts of power, real or
perceived. The theory of social judgability would support the notion that different
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roles, such as power and status roles, imply different sets of rules for making social
judgments (Leyens, 1983). Again, the follow-up study will attempt to clarify this
issue. In any case, the findings in the other three conditions were as predicted, and,
the main effect for power was found in Study 2 via the dispositional manipulation of
subjects' perceptions of power.
Study 2 indicates that dispositional manipulations of power have a strong
impact on impression formation as well. The fact that so many situations involve
ambiguous definitions of control confirms the importance of these findings. For
example, consider how personnel directors pass on "recommendations" of potential
employees to department heads for further consideration. If the personnel directors
are high-dominance they may assume they have more influence over the decision,
and they may employ category-based impression formation strategies. If so, the
likely result would be a "sifting" of the applicant pool that would remove stereotyped
applicants. The point is, high-dominance individuals use more category-based
processes when forming impressions in ambiguous power situations. To the extent
that these individuals also possess the characteristics necessary to achieve power
roles, they may be over-represented in high power positions. If the effects of
dominance and power compound each other, the result may be the over-application
and misuse of stereotypes in decision making by these individuals.
In conclusion, the studies described above begin to illuminate the picture of
how power works to influence impression formation. There are, however, still many
questions left unanswered about the role of power in impression formation. Future
studies will need to address the possibility that situational and dispositional
manipulations may interact to heighten the apparent effects of power, as well as the
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possibility that responsibility may have different meanings for people dependi
their power roles.
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ENDNOTES
1. Other factors in the environment (e.g., time constraints, low accountability for decisions) may
contnbute to this effect, reducing the resources or motivation necessary to individuate.
2. The order of presentation by ethnicity for the non-target applicants was stable across
conditions: Anglo, Anglo, Hispanic, Anglo.
3. These traits were generated by Robert Schatz during the spring semester of the 1990 academic
year. Twenty undergraduate psychology students indicated on a 7 point Likert scale
which traits they believed were part of traditional stereotypes for Anglos and for Puerto
Ricans. Traits were chosen on the basis of between-groups within-subjects contrasts
between the group means for each race. Appendix B contains the group means and
significance levels for each of the traits included in the present studies.
4. 1 was able to receive a copy of the original factor analysis of the scale from the authors. This
analysis indicated that, of the ten original items on the scale, the deleted item had the
lowest factor loading.
5. Subjects signed a consent form that was distorted so as not to reveal the true nature of the
study. Upon completion of the study they signed a second consent form and were
informed that they could remove their data from the pool if they felt uncomfortable with
the deception. No subject expressed feeling uncomfortable with the procedures; in fact,
many reported enjoying the study because it was unique compared to others in which
they had participated.
6. In previous research using the interdependence paradigm it has proven difficult to get any
responses from subjects unless they are specifically instructed to verbalize about eadi
trait sentence. Subjects otherwise tend to feel uncomfortable about speaking aloud into
the audio-recording device which inhibits them from responding. I do not believe this
presents a problem with the timing data as previous studies have successfully used this
technique.
7. It was, in fact not necessary to control for these differences. However it is interesting to note
that there was no correlation between subjects' scores on the MRS and their CPI
dominance scores, r=.08, p>.05.
8. Although only one judge coded the responses for this study, a second judge previously trained
to use the coding scheme cross-coded 36 responses. These responses were analyzed for
inter-rater reliability and revealed no significant difference between the two judges
ratings. Kappa coefficients ranged from Kappa =.62 for elaborations to Kappa =.93 for
evaluations.
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE APPLICATION FORM
APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT
STUDENT INTERN PROGRAM
City of Springfield, MA
PLEASE TYPE. FILL IH ALL BLANKS COMPLETELT.
PERSONAL
Name: Hernandez, Juanlta Maria
Last First Middle
Address: 186 Talmadifp nr. Snr^nl»f^P^^^ MA mini
1 No. /Street City, State Zip
B Soc. Sec. No. : A32 - 79 - 8092 Home Phone: (413 ) 737 - 9099
EDUCATION
Years '
Area of Study Completed Name of School
High School 3 Central High School
Other
PRIOR WORK EXPERIENCE
List the last three positions held, beginning with the w>st recent cnployer. Include any volunteer uoric or Military service.
Hours/
Employer/Phone Niomber Job Title From To Week
1, City of Springfield Student Intern 6/91 9/91 20
Responsibilities: I was responsible for filing and typing/word processing.
2. International House of Pancakes Waitress 5/20/90 5/2/91 15-20
Responsibilities: in addition to waiting tables, I operated the cash register and
closed UD on the weekends.
3.
Responsibi1ities
:
HONORS AND AWARDS
Please list any honors or awards you have received, including scholarships and nenterships In honor societies.
All City Chorus 1990, All State Chorus-Finalist 1990. Choir Treasurer. 1989-90
Spanish Students Association-Secretary, 1989-Present ^
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
Please list below any hobbies and/or other activites in which you participate. ^ ^^^^ soprano in my school
Nov 28
Today's Oate:_
mi
11
.
20
.
91
choir. I have had the lead in two high school musical productions and I
enjoy acting.
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APPLICANT SKILLS INVENTORY
Please check only those skills which you feel you have
Typing
ninlnuin speed tjq (wpm)
Other
Shorthand
Bookkeeping
Accounting
Editing/Proofing
Filing
Maintaining Payroll/
Personnel Records
Medical Records
gained through prior work experience and/or education.
CLERICAL
Office Machinpg
Adding machine
JS Mimeo/Ditto
_2£ Word Processor
Switchboard/PBX
Library
Cataloguing
Library Research
Reference
Records
Management
DATA PROCESSING/COMPUTING
Packages
Report Generators
Graphics
Word Processing
Business Packages
Hardware-Micros
Apple
TRS-80
Wang
IBM PC
LANGUAGE SKILLS
Please list any foreign languages and indicate your proficiency by checking the appropriate box(es). If English is a secondlanguage, please include it also.
Language Read Write Speak
!• Spanish X X X
2. English X X X
PERSONAL REFERENCES (exclude former employers and relatives)
Yrs.
Name Phone Number Occupation Known
1. Wil 1 iam Randal 1 737-5990 Insurance Salesman 12
2. Alice Gaines 789-9321 Choir Director 3
3. Edward Abbott 736-4375 Artist/Teacher 9
All answers to the foregoing questions are true and correct to the best of
my knowledge and belief. It is understood that any false statements will
be sufficient reason for my dismissal from the service of the City of
Springfield. I authorize investigation of any or all statements contained
in this application.
SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT
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APPENDIX B: MEAN TRAIT RATINGS BY ETHNIC GROUP
MEANS
Trait Anglo
Puerto
Rican p value '
Ambitious
Educated
Efficient
Good manners
Industrious
Neat
5.60
5.85
5.10
4.85
5.55
4.55
2.95
2.85
2.70
2.80
3.40
2.70
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0001
Emotional
Feels inferior
Ignorant
Loud
Radical
Unreliable
3.60
2.55
3.60
4.70
2.85
3.10
5.30
4.10
5.10
5.80
4.20
4.30
.0010
.0025
.0074
.0074
.0050
.0050
1 These significance values are based on within-groups t-contrasts between the group means.
They are not adjusted for multiple contrasts and therefore are somewhat biased.
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APPENDIX C: TRAIT GROUP COMBINATIONS
GROUP A
Anglo
Ambitious
Educated
Good manners
Hispanic
Emotional
Loud
Unreliable
GROUP
B
Anglo
Industrious
Efficient
Neat
Hispanic
Feels inferior
Ignorant
Radical
GROUP C
Anglo
Ambitious
Educated
Good manners
Hispanic
Feels inferior
Ignorant
Radical
GROUP D
Anglo
Industrious
Efficient
Neat
Hispanic
Emotional
Loud
Unreliable
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APPENDIX D: HUMANITARIAN/EGALITARIAN VALUES SCALE
Subjects responded to the following items using a six-point Likert scale
ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree."
1. One should be kind to all people.
2. One should find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself.
3. A person should be concerned about the well-being of others.
4. There should be equality for everyone-because we are all human beings.
5. Those who are unable to provide for their basic human needs should be helped by
others.
6. A good society is one in which people feel responsible for one another.
7. Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in most things.
8. Acting to protect the rights and interests of other members of the community is a
major obligation for all persons.
9. Prosperous nations have a moral obligation to share some of their wealth with
poor nations.
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APPENDIX E: CALIFORNIA PSYCHOLOGICAL INVENTORY DOMINANCE
SCALE
Subjects were instructed to respond as to whether or not they agreed with
each item, i.e., true or false.
I. 1 doubt whether I would make a good leader.
2. 1 think I would enjoy having authority over other people.
3. I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job.
4. When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of the right things to talk
about.
5. Every citizen should take the time to find out about national affairs, even if it
means giving up some personal pleasures.
6. I am certainly lacking in self-confidence.
7. When I work on a committee I like to take charge of things.
8. If given the chance I would make a good leader of people.
9. Sometimes at elections i vote for candidate about whom I know very little.
10. When prices are high you can't blame people for getting all they can while the
getting is good.
II. In school I found it very hard to talk before the class.
12. 1 am a better talker than a listener.
13. We should cut down on our use of oil, if necessary, so that there will be plenty
left for the people fifty or a hundred years from now.
14. When the community makes a decision, it is up to a person to help carry it out
even if he or she had been against it.
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15. 1 would rather have people dislike me than look down on me.
16. I must admit I try to see what others think before I take a stand.
17. People should not have to pay taxes for the schools if they do not have children.
18. In a group, I usually take the responsibility for getting people introduced.
19. 1 would be willing to describe myself as a pretty "strong' personality.
20. I must admit I am a pretty fair talker.
21. I have strong political opinions.
22. 1 think I am usually a leader in my group.
23. I seem to do things that I regret more often than other people do.
24. Disobedience to any government is never justified.
25. 1 enjoy planning things, and deciding what each person should do.
26. I would rather not have very much responsibility for other people.
27. I usually have to stop and think before I act even in trifling matters.
28. It is pretty easy for people to win arguments with me.
29. I have not lived the right kind of life.
30. I have a natural talent for influencing people.
31. 1 like to give orders and get things moving.
32. I am embarrassed with people I do not know well.
33. I'm not the type to be a political leader.
34. People seem naturally to turn to me when decisions have to be made.
35. 1 dislike having to talk in front of a group of people.
36. 1 have more trouble concentrating than others seem to have.
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APPENDIX F: MODERN RACISM SCALE
Subjects responded to the following items using a five-point scale ranging
from "disagree strongly" to "agree strongly."
I. Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time.
2. 1 would oppose a constitutional amendment aimed at ridding the country of
pornography and sexual immorality.
3. In a democratic society, the opinion of the majority should always prevail.
4. Race is one factor in determining intelligence.
5. 1 favor laws that permit anyone to rent or purchase housing even when the person
offering the property for sale or rent does not wish to rent or sell it to that
type of person.
6. Sex education should be taught in the public school systems of the United States.
7. It is easy to understand the anger of minorities in America.
8. Women aren't safe anymore on the streets at night in my neighborhood.
9. Over the past few years, minorities have gotten more economically than they
deserve.
10. I am opposed to the United States maintaining formal diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China.
II. A distaste for work usually reflects a weakness of character.
12. Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more
respect for minorities than they deserve.
13. I favor open or fair housing laws.
14. The United States Senate should not enter arms limitation negotiations with Russia.
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15. I would favor a constitutional amendment to permit non-sectarian prayers and
religious services in the public schools.
16. Some groups are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
17. Generally speaking, I favor full racial integration.
18. I favor ratification of the ERA (Equal Rights Amendment) to the United States
Constitution.
19. 1 favor a strong build-up od U.S. defense capabilities.
20. Minorities have more influence upon school desegregation plans than they ought
to have.
21. It was wrong for the United States Supreme Court to outlaw segregation in its
1954 decision.
22. It is wrong for a woman to ask a man out on a date.
23. The United States Senate did the right thing when it passed the Reagan
economic package.
24. Discrimination against minorities is no longer a problem in the United States.
25. It is easy to understand the anger of women in America.
26. Busing elementary school children to schools in other parts of the city or suburbs
only harms their education.
27. Most of the people on welfare need it and could not get along without it.
28. Interracial marriages are generally a bad idea.
29. In a divorce, the woman should always receive custody of the children.
30. If a black family with about the same level of income and education as I have
moved next door, I would mind it a great deal.
31. Streets aren't safe these days without a policeman around.
32. An all-out nuclear war is probably inevitable within my lifetime.
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G: LOW RESPONSIBILITY CONDITION QUESTIONNAIRE-STUDY 2
L Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time.
2. In a democratic society, the opinion of the majority should always prevail.
3. Women aren't safe anymore on the streets at night in my neighborhood.
4. 1 favor ratification of the ERA (Equal Rights Amendment) to the United States
Constitution.
5. 1 favor a strong build-up od U.S. defense capabilities.
6. Most of the people on welfare need it and could not get along without it.
7. In a divorce, the woman should always receive custody of the children.
8. An all-out nuclear war is probably inevitable within my lifetime.
9. The United States Senate did the right thing when it passed the Reagan economic
package.
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